Overview: NSM-10 and CNSA 2.0 Relationship
On May 4, 2022, the White House issued National Security Memorandum 10 (NSM-10), directing all U.S. federal agencies to begin planning and executing a transition to quantum-resistant cryptography. This memorandum set a policy mandate.
Four months later, in September 2022, the NSA published CNSA 2.0 (Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0)—the technical specification that implements NSM-10’s policy direction for National Security Systems (NSS). CNSA 2.0 is binding for DoD, Intelligence Community (IC) contractors, and all other entities handling classified or sensitive national security information.
Key distinction:
- NSM-10 = Policy mandate for all federal agencies
- CNSA 2.0 = Technical algorithm requirements + timelines for NSS (national security systems)
- OMB M-23-02 (November 2022) = Implementation guidance for civilian agencies without NSS systems
CNSA 2.0 Approved Algorithm Suite
Key Encapsulation (Replacing RSA, ECDH)
- ML-KEM-1024 (FIPS 203) — Primary for long-term protection
- ML-KEM-768 (FIPS 203) — Acceptable where 128-bit security suffices
- HQC (future NIST standard, ~2027) — Backup/diversity algorithm
Digital Signatures (Replacing ECDSA, RSA)
- ML-DSA-87 (FIPS 204) — Primary for long-term protection; higher security margin
- ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) — Acceptable where 128-bit security suffices
- SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) — Stateless hash-based alternative
- XMSS/LMS (NIST SP 800-208) — For firmware and software signing
Symmetric & Hash Algorithms (Unchanged)
- AES-256 — Encryption (no quantum attack threat)
- SHA-384, SHA-512 — Hashing (no quantum attack threat; SHAKE-256 also acceptable)
Legacy Algorithms (Being Deprecated)
- RSA — Key establishment; deprecation begins immediately in priority systems
- ECDH, ECDSA — Key exchange & signatures; phase-out per timeline below
- SHA-256 — May be used but SHA-384/512 preferred
CNSA 2.0 Migration Timeline: By System Category
NSA’s migration strategy is phased by system type, not by a single agency-wide deadline. Different systems have different risk profiles and implementation complexity.
| System Category | 2025 Target | 2026–2030 Window | 2030 Deadline | 2033 Deadline |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Software/Firmware Signing | CNSA 2.0 preferred | — | Exclusive use | — |
| Network Equipment (VPN, routers) | Support + prefer CNSA 2.0 | Deploy CNSA 2.0 | Prefer exclusive | — |
| Web Browsers & Servers | Support CNSA 2.0 | Deploy where feasible | Preferred | Exclusive use |
| Operating Systems | Support CNSA 2.0 | Deploy widely | Preferred | Exclusive use |
| Enterprise & Legacy Systems | Assess & plan | Execute migration | Support CNSA 2.0 | Exclusive use |
| Highly Constrained Devices | Assess feasibility | Limited deployment | Assess upgrade path | — |
Detailed Timeline by System Type
1. Software & Firmware Code Signing (2025 deadline)
Immediate action required: This is the earliest transition point.
- 2025 (NOW): All software and firmware signatures must support CNSA 2.0 (ML-DSA-87 or XMSS/LMS for firmware)
- 2030: Exclusive use of CNSA 2.0 required
- Why first: Code signing is relatively low-complexity and high-impact; securing the supply chain is foundational
Implementation approach:
- Dual-sign initial releases (classical + CNSA 2.0)
- Deprecate classical-only signatures by 2028
- Enforce signature validation against CNSA 2.0
Standards: NIST SP 800-208 (XMSS/LMS for stateful firmware signing)
2. Network Equipment (VPNs, Routers, Firewalls) (2026–2030)
Timelines:
- 2026: Vendors must offer support for CNSA 2.0 in IKEv2/IPsec
- 2030: NSA expects exclusive use of CNSA 2.0 for key establishment
- Pressure point: Enterprises with 5–10 year hardware refresh cycles must begin procurement NOW
Implementation approach:
- Use RFC 9242 (IKEv2 intermediate exchange for large keys) and RFC 9370 (hybrid KEMs in IKEv2)
- Deploy hybrid mode: classical ECDH + ML-KEM-1024 in parallel
- Phase out pure classical by 2028–2029
Responsible parties: Juniper, Cisco, Palo Alto Networks, Check Point, and other NSA-validated vendors must support CNSA 2.0 by 2026
3. Web Browsers, Servers, TLS (2026–2033)
Timelines:
- 2025–2026: TLS implementations must support CNSA 2.0 (via IETF drafts or RFC once finalized)
- 2033: Exclusive use required
Current status (April 2026):
- Google Chrome and Cloudflare have been running X25519Kyber768 (hybrid) TLS experiments since August 2023
- Draft RFCs (draft-ietf-tls-mlkem, draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-mlkem) are approaching finalization
- Major CDNs (Cloudflare, Akamai, AWS CloudFront) expected to offer CNSA 2.0 TLS by 2026
Implementation challenge: Certificate chain inflation. ML-DSA-87 public keys (~2592 bytes) are much larger than ECDSA P-256 (~64 bytes), affecting:
- Certificate storage in HSMs
- Network latency (more bytes in ServerHello)
- Mobile clients with constrained bandwidth
4. Operating Systems (2027–2033)
Timeline:
- 2027: Major OS vendors (Microsoft, Apple, Linux distributions) expected to ship with CNSA 2.0 support
- 2033: Exclusive use required
What this means:
- Windows Server, macOS, Linux kernels must support ML-KEM, ML-DSA in TLS, SSH, certificate validation
- Cryptographic libraries (OpenSSL, BoringSSL) must have hardened, tested PQC implementations
- User-facing apps (browsers, email clients) must validate CNSA 2.0 certificates
5. Enterprise & Legacy Systems (2026–2033)
Timeline:
- 2026: Inventory of legacy cryptographic systems due to NSA
- 2030: Majority of upgradeable systems should support CNSA 2.0
- 2033: All systems must use CNSA 2.0 (exception: certified-obsolete hardware beyond repair)
Challenge: Large enterprises may have 20–30 year lifespans for some systems (industrial control, banking mainframes). NSA allows phased migration but no hard exemptions after 2033.
Scope: What is a “National Security System”?
NSA defines NSS as: Systems that process classified information or handle sensitive national security data, including:
- DoD Systems — All Department of Defense networks, weapons systems, command & control
- Intelligence Community — CIA, NSA, NRO, DIA systems
- Cleared Contractors — Companies processing classified information under DFARS (Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement) contracts
- Critical Infrastructure — Some DHS-designated critical infrastructure with NSS designation
- Unclassified but Sensitive Systems — Systems handling CUI (Controlled Unclassified Information) marked as “NATIONAL SECURITY”
Scope exclusions: Systems processing only unclassified, non-sensitive data may transition at their own pace (but should still follow federal guidance).
Cleared Contractor Compliance Chain
Defense contractors and cleared organizations must comply with CNSA 2.0 through contractual mechanisms:
DFARS Flow-Down Requirements
- DFARS 252.204-7012 — Contract clause requiring cybersecurity compliance
- NIST SP 800-171 — Standard security requirements for CUI; being updated with PQC expectations
- CMMC 2.0 — Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification; PQC alignment expected in 2026 updates
Compliance Verification
- DoD CISO audits contractor systems
- Self-assessment via CMMC Level 2 certification
- Supply chain risk management reviews
Timeline Implications
- Contractors must begin migration 2025–2026 to show progress by 2027 audits
- Failure to demonstrate CNSA 2.0 planning can result in contract suspension
Key People & Leadership
Robert (Rob) Joyce — Former NSA Cybersecurity Director
Career:
- Joined NSA in 1990
- Led NSA Cybersecurity Collaboration Center
- Served as NSA Cybersecurity Director (2021–March 2024)
- Signed the CNSA 2.0 announcement (September 2022) as Cybersecurity Director
Post-NSA (2024–present):
- Founded Joyce Cyber LLC providing cybersecurity consulting
- Joined OpenAI Safety & Security Committee
- Advises Microsoft, PwC, and other firms on PQC adoption
Significance: Joyce’s cybersecurity leadership at NSA ensured CNSA 2.0 reflected operational realities of U.S. national security systems and was achievable within stated timelines.
Anne Neuberger — Deputy National Security Advisor (During NSM-10 Era)
Career:
- Served as Deputy National Security Advisor for Cyber and Emerging Technology under the Biden administration (2021–January 2025)
- Coordinated NSM-10 policy across agencies
- Acted as liaison between NSA, NIST, CISA, and White House during early PQC transition planning
Post-government (2025–present):
- Senior Advisor at Andreessen Horowitz (venture capital)
- Payne Lecturer at Stanford University
- Distinguished Fellow, Royal United Services Institute
Significance: Neuberger was instrumental in framing PQC migration as a national security priority and securing presidential authority (NSM-10) to mandate federal agency participation.
Critical Timeline Pressure Points (2026–2030)
Now (April 2026): Firmware Signing & Early Procurement
- Organizations should be completing firmware signing transition planning
- Network equipment procurement should account for CNSA 2.0 delivery dates
- Large enterprise TLS certificate renewal cycles should plan for larger ML-DSA certificates
2026 (This Year)
- IETF TLS drafts expected to advance toward RFC (finalization likely 2026–2027)
- Major TLS implementations (OpenSSL, BoringSSL) shipping with stable ML-KEM support
- CISA expects federal agencies to have CNSA 2.0 procurement plans in place
- First FedRAMP authorizations with PQC support expected
2027–2028: The Crunch Years
- Operating systems should ship with native CNSA 2.0 support
- Large enterprises must transition network infrastructure
- TLS certificate deployment reaches critical mass
- Hardware HSM vendors must certify PQC implementations
2030 (Firmware & Network Equipment Exclusive)
- Firmware must be signed exclusively with CNSA 2.0
- Network equipment must support CNSA 2.0 as primary mode
- Organizations without credible progress toward 2033 deadline face compliance pressure
2033 (Exclusive Use Deadline)
- All NSS systems must use CNSA 2.0 exclusively
- RSA and ECDH officially deprecated for all new protocols
- Late-stage migrations become high-risk and high-cost
Implementation Challenges
- Certificate size inflation: ML-DSA-87 certificates (~4–6 KB) vs. ECDSA P-256 (~1 KB) create network latency and storage pressure
- Hardware constraints: Cryptographic accelerators and HSMs must support ML-KEM, ML-DSA; many legacy devices cannot
- Backward compatibility: Dual-algorithm support (classical + CNSA 2.0) extends implementation timelines
- Testing & validation: FIPS 140-3 cryptographic module validation for new algorithms is time-consuming
- Enterprise entropy: Enterprise RNG (random number generation) must scale to support higher-entropy ML-KEM key generation